Here's a recent article we've included in this month's Sudanic. Click on the images for a closer read. Enjoy.
Friday, March 13, 2009
Sudanic Magazine: Southern Sudan as an Investment Destination
Sudanic is a Sudanese-focused current events/politics and business magazine published every other month. It's got great production vales and has a good amount of fresh reporting, relevant commentary and an indigenous understanding of Sudanese culture. If in Southern Sudan, you can find the magazine at the larger book/magazine outlets. If you see it, grab a copy. You wont be disappointed.
Here's a recent article we've included in this month's Sudanic. Click on the images for a closer read. Enjoy.
Here's a recent article we've included in this month's Sudanic. Click on the images for a closer read. Enjoy.
Business Journal Africa article on Sudan
Looks like Business Journal Africa is off the web, otherwise I'd do a link to their article. That wont stop us from getting it to our dear readers, though. I've copied it to the post below.
A few small points of error in the article, and an unusual dancing around of the current foreign currency shortfalls, especially within the Government of Southern Sudan.
As some readers here may know, the central government in Khartoum has been withholding monthly oil dividends from the GOSS. Why? Because it is what they do. And, the low price of oil is severely cutting revenues (oil represents more than 80% of Khartoum's exports).
Never fear, however. GOSS is chasing down options and finding solutions in a responsible and thorough manner. More on this to come. The article leaves out a few points; namely that although the GOSS is having trouble finding cash right now, that does not mean that cash is lacking. It's there and those that supply it to the market (through banks and foreign currency exchangers) are really doing well -- if they can keep the foreign currency coming in.
Apart from this, we're starting to see an (anecdotal) loss of the Sudanese Pound to the Dollar. About 20-25% since the beginning of the year!
Now, here's the article. Click on the images to bring up a readable version.
A few small points of error in the article, and an unusual dancing around of the current foreign currency shortfalls, especially within the Government of Southern Sudan.
As some readers here may know, the central government in Khartoum has been withholding monthly oil dividends from the GOSS. Why? Because it is what they do. And, the low price of oil is severely cutting revenues (oil represents more than 80% of Khartoum's exports).
Never fear, however. GOSS is chasing down options and finding solutions in a responsible and thorough manner. More on this to come. The article leaves out a few points; namely that although the GOSS is having trouble finding cash right now, that does not mean that cash is lacking. It's there and those that supply it to the market (through banks and foreign currency exchangers) are really doing well -- if they can keep the foreign currency coming in.
Apart from this, we're starting to see an (anecdotal) loss of the Sudanese Pound to the Dollar. About 20-25% since the beginning of the year!
Now, here's the article. Click on the images to bring up a readable version.
Friday, March 6, 2009
The ICC: What do the Sudanese people think?
Given the tight controls of media and information in general in Khartoum, outside observers are forced to make their own conclusions about what the people think of their leadership and the ICC in particular.
In my conversations with both foreigners and Sudanese, these opinions vary dramatically. All of the outsiders' opinions, though of course not nearly as succinct or in contact with the realities as the Sudanese, have at least a kernel of truth to them.
There's an interesting Sudan Tribune article on the subject today that is absolutely worth a read. Though just a random "man-on-the-street" grab of opinions, it is quite telling. Read the article here.
My opinion, which I'll admit is simply one of many, is that the supporters of the regime are those whom rely on it for its largesse. With the pool of money shrinking, and the cost of support increasing with Sudan's inflation, there is a coming point when the regime will simply be unable to pay supporters to support it.
Here's some backgound observations on the economy in "the north": Since the late 80's and early 90's Sudan's independent upper and middle class have had their professions, assets and businesses either stripped, nationalized, radically devalued, or sidelined by government policies. The regime sought to stifle pockets of competition from political, economic, academic and professional circles and created an environment that made competitors dependent on party affiliation for jobs, economic opportunity or safety from military service that could be a death sentence. I've seen this first hand: businesses exhausted by lack of government 'permits' and competition by regime-affiliated companies, the middle class struggling to live on 1980's-level wages, and ever-dwindling avenues for private wealth development. It's evident that the productive classes of the society are being deliberately boxed-out and impoverished.
Jumping back to the ICC issue, I believe that the only life raft President Bashir can cling to now is nationalism. Nationalism, led by the party and its recipients, as a defense to this situation is going to have to be big, expensive, and kept at a fast jog -- in perpetuity. The regime uses rallies to demonstrate support. The bodies in the rallies are those of supporters from within the government and parastatal companies. If they are on the street dancing with the President, they aren't being productive. Can this task be borne by the regime? I don't believe so.
The fall back to this option with be the regime using the lash to keep its population in check. It does so to some degree now, but like the reliance on nationalism, that is usually to the massive detriment to the economy. Strikes, shunning by world markets, reliance on a single commodity for foreign currency inputs, economic sabotage and the typically poorly run parastatal organizations will cause the economic downturn to accelerate.
Lost government revenue, the high cost of a security/military apparatus fighting the population, and lost revenue to regime supporters, will eventually force regime leaders to make tough decisions. That will likely mean either putting President Bashir out to pasture and re-creating the political environment to allow economic breathing room, or simply sinking the whole ship of state.
Given the actions by the NCP in the past 20 years, I would not place a wager on which direction they will take.
In my conversations with both foreigners and Sudanese, these opinions vary dramatically. All of the outsiders' opinions, though of course not nearly as succinct or in contact with the realities as the Sudanese, have at least a kernel of truth to them.
There's an interesting Sudan Tribune article on the subject today that is absolutely worth a read. Though just a random "man-on-the-street" grab of opinions, it is quite telling. Read the article here.
My opinion, which I'll admit is simply one of many, is that the supporters of the regime are those whom rely on it for its largesse. With the pool of money shrinking, and the cost of support increasing with Sudan's inflation, there is a coming point when the regime will simply be unable to pay supporters to support it.
Here's some backgound observations on the economy in "the north": Since the late 80's and early 90's Sudan's independent upper and middle class have had their professions, assets and businesses either stripped, nationalized, radically devalued, or sidelined by government policies. The regime sought to stifle pockets of competition from political, economic, academic and professional circles and created an environment that made competitors dependent on party affiliation for jobs, economic opportunity or safety from military service that could be a death sentence. I've seen this first hand: businesses exhausted by lack of government 'permits' and competition by regime-affiliated companies, the middle class struggling to live on 1980's-level wages, and ever-dwindling avenues for private wealth development. It's evident that the productive classes of the society are being deliberately boxed-out and impoverished.
Jumping back to the ICC issue, I believe that the only life raft President Bashir can cling to now is nationalism. Nationalism, led by the party and its recipients, as a defense to this situation is going to have to be big, expensive, and kept at a fast jog -- in perpetuity. The regime uses rallies to demonstrate support. The bodies in the rallies are those of supporters from within the government and parastatal companies. If they are on the street dancing with the President, they aren't being productive. Can this task be borne by the regime? I don't believe so.
The fall back to this option with be the regime using the lash to keep its population in check. It does so to some degree now, but like the reliance on nationalism, that is usually to the massive detriment to the economy. Strikes, shunning by world markets, reliance on a single commodity for foreign currency inputs, economic sabotage and the typically poorly run parastatal organizations will cause the economic downturn to accelerate.
Lost government revenue, the high cost of a security/military apparatus fighting the population, and lost revenue to regime supporters, will eventually force regime leaders to make tough decisions. That will likely mean either putting President Bashir out to pasture and re-creating the political environment to allow economic breathing room, or simply sinking the whole ship of state.
Given the actions by the NCP in the past 20 years, I would not place a wager on which direction they will take.
Thursday, February 19, 2009
A Marked Difference in Governing
When we hear and read so many opinions on the future of Sudan/Southern Sudan, I find it remarkable that "analysts" will paint both northern and southern leaders with the same brush and miss the obvious differences.
More specifically, I recently read some remarkably poor analysis from Chatham House on Sudan and its future. While I will spare readers my negative review of this poorly reasoned report, one thought begs mention; the difference in leadership exhibited between the northern junta and the Government of Southern Sudan.
I'll sum it up in how each side deals with a similar situation; tribal conflict, community tensions and open warfare (open warfare in Sudan, dear readers, is simply community tensions that have been incubated).
First, the regime in Khartoum has a boilerplate response: send in the troops, bomb civilians and generally break things and hurt people. Oh, and resist outsiders trying to help protect innocents when the "solution" gets too savage.
Conversely, the Government of Southern Sudan, though certainly not perfect, takes a different approach to the same problem: send in the President to mediate, encourage resolution and bring the facts to the people.
I'd have to say, this is a stark contrast that is often overlooked by the professional "analysts."
Follow up:
Certainly worthy of another post, but the Government of Southern Sudan has completed a (long-overdue, perhaps) security policy. A worthy and telling quote that is nub of the document's purpose, and the governments' security and governing mission;
More specifically, I recently read some remarkably poor analysis from Chatham House on Sudan and its future. While I will spare readers my negative review of this poorly reasoned report, one thought begs mention; the difference in leadership exhibited between the northern junta and the Government of Southern Sudan.
I'll sum it up in how each side deals with a similar situation; tribal conflict, community tensions and open warfare (open warfare in Sudan, dear readers, is simply community tensions that have been incubated).
First, the regime in Khartoum has a boilerplate response: send in the troops, bomb civilians and generally break things and hurt people. Oh, and resist outsiders trying to help protect innocents when the "solution" gets too savage.
Conversely, the Government of Southern Sudan, though certainly not perfect, takes a different approach to the same problem: send in the President to mediate, encourage resolution and bring the facts to the people.
I'd have to say, this is a stark contrast that is often overlooked by the professional "analysts."
Follow up:
Certainly worthy of another post, but the Government of Southern Sudan has completed a (long-overdue, perhaps) security policy. A worthy and telling quote that is nub of the document's purpose, and the governments' security and governing mission;
“The Government of Southern Sudan exists for the ultimate purpose of ensuring the security and sovereignty of the people of Southern Sudan …Though we have limited resources, we will seek to minimize risk while focusing our efforts on those activities that are most vital to securing our interests,”Bravo.
Monday, February 16, 2009
Sudan peace partners submit new set of filings on Abyei
Readers may note that we've written about the importance of the Abyei boundary issue in north-south political terms. Simplified, the issue is one of the significant hurdles to minimizing tension (flowing from the ambiguity over a contested border) and setting up the dialogue/process/framework for whatever may happen in the 2011 referendum on separation. This is the current focus point for north-south tension, and neither side wants to concede political points to the other -- the risk of alienating their constituencies in the area is too great, and the oil reserves under the area are too valuable.
The CPA did spell out a process for determining the common border, but the northern partner rejected the outcome of the commission mandated with researching the subject and presenting their findings. The parties agreed to binding arbitration in the Hague and the process is moving forward. Here's the relevant data:
The CPA did spell out a process for determining the common border, but the northern partner rejected the outcome of the commission mandated with researching the subject and presenting their findings. The parties agreed to binding arbitration in the Hague and the process is moving forward. Here's the relevant data:
The SPLM/A and Government of Sudan submitted a second round of arguments to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague, which is tasked with ruling on the dispute over the Abyei Boundaries Commission.Abyei is an oil-rich area also used by Misseriya and Dinka pastoralists to graze cattle.
The two signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM, agreed in June 2008, in a roadmap to resolve Abyei disagreement, to refer their dispute to an arbitration tribunal. They formally referred their case to the PCA on July 12, 2008.
. . .
The opposing legal teams will now review each other’s arguments and respond with a third written submission to the tribunal on February 28, after which no additional written submissions will be provided unless requested by the arbiters. Oral hearings are then scheduled for April 18-23 after which the tribunal must issue its final decision within 90 days — no later than the end of July of this year.
Friday, February 13, 2009
Sudan’s Growth to Fall After Oil Peak
All things considered, looks like a depressing lede, but the last sentence is telling: a decline in pan-Sudanese growth from 12.7 to 7.9 percent. A growth rate of almost 8 percent is nothing to sneeze at.
Sudan’s oil production will peak next year before it starts to consistently fall, according to a new forecast.Oil and gas liquids production will increase by one third (30.3 percent), with volumes peaking at 700,000b/d in 2010, according to a Business Monitor International forecast.
But the oil and gas volumes will then steadily fall to 596,000b/d by the end of the 2018, according to Business Monitor.And growth is forecast to fall from 12.7 percent in 2008 to 7.9 percent this year.
Sudan Election Law
Having participated in more than a few elections in my time, the importance of a country's or state's election law cannot be understated. It establishes, for all intents and purposes, the playing field, referrees, grandstands and rules for the election contest.
Historically, Sudan has had some seemingly functionable and interesting election laws. Unfortunately, few would argue that the elections were fully fair or uncompromised by the regime du jour.
In accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Government of National Unity Constitution, Sudan (that's north and south folks) has updated its election laws.
I have some reservations about the law from the start, mainly due to the constitution of the election commission (all nomintated by President Bashir and approved by Vice President Kiir). This sets up a formula where Bashir can nominate people he knows Kiir will not accept, thereby delaying the stand up of the commission and delay of the elections.
There's more to it, and we'll post an update here shortly. We also expect the Government of Southern Sudan to pass its own election laws. More on that soon, too.
Historically, Sudan has had some seemingly functionable and interesting election laws. Unfortunately, few would argue that the elections were fully fair or uncompromised by the regime du jour.
In accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Government of National Unity Constitution, Sudan (that's north and south folks) has updated its election laws.
I have some reservations about the law from the start, mainly due to the constitution of the election commission (all nomintated by President Bashir and approved by Vice President Kiir). This sets up a formula where Bashir can nominate people he knows Kiir will not accept, thereby delaying the stand up of the commission and delay of the elections.
There's more to it, and we'll post an update here shortly. We also expect the Government of Southern Sudan to pass its own election laws. More on that soon, too.
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